MACO, M.: Matematické vety ako pravidlá I. / Mathematical Propositions as Rules I.
Philosophica Critica, vol. 5, 2019, no. 2, ISSN 13398970, pp. 220


Publication date: December 15, 2019

Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to convince the reader that in philosophizing about mathematics, the least misleading and most productive way of understanding mathematics is the so called normative conception; i. e. the way of conceiving mathematical propositions as rules and not as descriptive sentences. This approach has been inspired by the works of later L. Wittgenstein. I attempt to reach the outlined objective in two steps. In the first step, I will focus on how mathematics actually becomes a philosophical problem. The second step will consist in introducing a normative understanding of mathematics, and in particular its core: the normative account of mathematical propositions. I will try to answer the question of what it means to understand mathematical propositions as rules and I will emphasize the naturalness and productivity of this understanding.The forthcoming second part of the paper will contain responses to several standard objections to the normative conception of mathematics.
Key words: Mathematics – Philosophy of Mathematics – Mathematical Proposition – Rules – Description – Wittgenstein
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2019.5.2.220
Key words: Mathematics – Philosophy of Mathematics – Mathematical Proposition – Rules – Description – Wittgenstein
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2019.5.2.220