Restructuration and Systemic Change: Haugaard's Discussion of the Importance of Others in the Theory of Structuration

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Purpose of this paper is to outline Mark Haugaard's reconstructive critique of Anthony Giddens' account of systemic stability and change within the framework of the theory of structuration. This position argues that while the theory explains societal repro-duction on the level of the individual, it leaves the intersubjective and relational dimension of human existence undertheorized. As a result, it tends to appear too voluntaristic in relation to systemic change and, at the same time, biased towards systemic stability. The paper begins with a brief overview of the theory of structura-tion before moving on to Haugaard's critique and reformulation that allows for theorization of systemic stability and change thro-ugh modalities of interaction between multiple structuring agents.

Key words: Structuration – Agency – Haugaard – Giddens

Introduction

Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration seeks to replace the ontological dualism between social structure and agency with the conception of duality (Giddens 1984, 25)[1]. This position sees structures as inherent in, and reproduced by, agency rather than physically forcing agents to act in particular way alongside

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[1] It is important to reiterate at the outset that Giddens' notion of the duality of structure and agency is focused at the level of the ontological rather than the epistemic. While the analytical distinction between those elements is very useful for the purposes of theoretical inquiry, it is located on the level of the epistemic. On the level of ontology (being-in-the-world), the structures are inherent in the agency (c.f. Giddens 1984, 16–37).

some pre-constructed path. Agency is facilitated by structures, however, it is not determined by them completely as social structures have no material existence independent of agents' consciousness and conduct. They only become external to agents in the moments of their reproduction: "Structure exists, as time-space presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents" (Giddens 1984, 17). Outside of these moments, structures exist as one form of knowledge of agents' social world, knowledge of rules. This knowledge is vast and people are not always aware of its extent or even functioning. Agents routinely, and often subconsciously, draw upon this knowledge in their day-to-day interactions and, in the process, reproduce the structural properties that constituted them as parti-cular agents in the first place. This notion of routinized, recursive, reproduction of structures through agency is at the core of the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1979; 1984). Haugaard's reconstructive critique of Giddens' model claims that the theory does not pay sufficient attention to the importance of structuring others. This creates problems when it is put to task of explaining stability or (and) change in social systems. Purpose of this paper is to briefly sketch out the contours of Haugaard's extension of the model in order to theorize the impor-tance of structuring others. I will begin by brief discussion of self, agency and structural reproduction within the theory of structuration before moving on to Haugaard's reconstruction.

Self, Agency and Structuration

Agents' conduct is mediated by their knowledge of the world. This knowledge is an outcome of their socialization process and therefore systemically constituted even if it is embodied in an individual. Agents routinely use this knowledge in order to function in their social context, to monitor their environment and beha-viour. While this monitoring is an ongoing process, agents are not always aware of its operation. Giddens' model of the self proposes the distinction between two levels of consciousness: *discursive consciousness* (d.c. further in the text), *practical consciousness* (p.c. further in the text) and the unconscious. While two levels of consciousness are to an extent, accessible to agents, the unconscious remains out-side of the discursive reach of an individual (Giddens 1984, 45). Discursive con-sciousness [d.c.] refers to knowledge the agents can put into words and actively consider when they pursue day-to-day goals. They are explicitly aware of the information being cognitively processed as well as able to examine it reflexively. Practical consciousness [p.c.] comprises of all information the agents have about

their world. It represents the preconscious or "tacit"[2] knowledge that agents are able to utilize in the course of their day-to-day lives without being discursively aware of the process itself. The body of p.c. knowledge acquired through the lifetime is enormous in terms of both, scope and detail and encompasses the information about physical and social world as well as manual and mental skills (Giddens 1984, 4, 26). Human brain is continuously processing impressive amount of information and the agents are, more often than not, discursively aware only of a fraction of this process. For example, imagine trying to describe the nuances of asking a friend for a favour, grammatical rules of a local argot or writing a step-by-step guide on how to tie your shoelaces. This knowledge guides agents' interpretations of and interactions with the world, regardless of being discursively registered by them. This position allows for transfer of knowledge from p.c. to d.c. and vice versa. Take the shoelaces example. A child learns to tie her shoelaces by someone else's demonstration. Then, for a time, she will do it in a step-by-step fashion, discursively concentrating on each step of the process. Once the technique is mastered, concentration on each step is no longer required – the discursively acquired knowledge has become p.c. knowledge through recursive practice. Now, in case this person needs to explain this process, she has to transform the p.c. knowledge back into the d.c. in order to be able to verbalize it. Although rather simplistically, this example outlines the mechanics of the transfer of knowledge between d.c. and p.c. Similar process can be observed in acquisition of grammar, particularly in cases of second language where it is possible to clearly animate a set of new rules against the background of already formed first language. Compared to a single motoric skill, the information that agents process in social interactions is much more complex. This process has also been subject to extensive research within psychology of cognition and memory that further corroborate this element of Giddens' account (c.f. Schacter, 1992; Ullman, 2004).

Such possibility of transfer opens the space for the theorization of discursive examination of p.c. knowledge by the agent. Giddens argues that finding oneself in unusual circumstances, where agents' can no longer rely on their p.c. knowledge to guide their actions, this knowledge can rapidly become available for discursive evaluation that can expose its contingency. The main point here is that agents are, to a large extent, aware of their social context. They know their world and have very good idea on how to go on living in it. They are able to predict the outcomes of their actions and reactions of others within their social system. And

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[2] The term "tacit knowledge" is often described in contradistinction to formal, codified or explicit knowledge. It is the kind of knowledge that is transferred through experience and observation rather than symbolically trough the language. Even though agents can use this knowledge they cannot codify it in language without difficulties (c.f. Polanyi 1966).

when prompted, they are able to give discursive explanations of the rules that guide their social world, recall the practical knowledge that pertains to it and re-evaluate its character. Hence, the claim that all competent social agents are "expert sociologists" (Giddens 1984, 26). One important qualification has to be made here, which is that while sociologists proper make it their business to dis-cursively examine these phenomena, the social agents are "expert" sociologists at the level of p.c. (Haugaard 1992, 78).

The concept of p.c. is crucial for explanation of intentionality and agency that is still shaped by structural relations. Structures exist as a form of knowledge of rules on the level of p.c. outside of the moments of their instantiation in action. This enables Giddens to argue that agency, while being an outcome of purposive intentions and planning, is nonetheless a product, as well as medium of repro-duction, of structural constraint and enablement[3]. "The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represents a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize" (Giddens 1984, 25).

In addition to p.c. and d.c, the agency is influenced by the unconscious consist-ing of: "those forms of cognition and impulsion which are either wholly repressed from consciousness or appear only in distorted form" (Giddens 1984, 5). While the full account of unconscious in the theory of structuration is beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to say at this point that the unconscious constitutes a motivational component of action that commits the agents to integrate their practices across time-space in order to safeguard their sense of ontological security. This, for Giddens, can be characterized by a sense of trust in their being-in-the-world, kind of a feeling that agents know their social milieu and are confident in their ability to function in it. Following the theories of psycho-social development, he argues that humans develop this basic security system in early childhood while being cared for, when the only response to unfamiliar circum-stances is anxiety. Infants learn to overcome this anxiety by development of relationship of trust with their primary carers through establishment of routi-nes (c.f. Ainsworth – Bell, 1970; Erikson, 1963). Later in life, this trust extends to the wider world by learning its regularities. While it is possible to examine p.c. knowledge on the level of d.c., agents cannot directly access the unconscious. As its development takes place very early in the childhood before the development of language, agents cannot examine it discursively. Rather, agents are motivated

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[3] For Giddens the social structures are always enabling and constraining at the same time. The structures enable particular forms of agency by imposing limitations (constraint) upon possible options open to actors within the context of structured interaction (c.f. Giddens 1984, 25–28, 169–180).

by the unconscious drive towards the reduction of this elementary anxiety or ontological insecurity through the establishment of routines which allows them some degree of predictability in their existence (Giddens 1984, 7–9). The state of ontological security is important factor in agents' conduct. Moving through their day-to-day activities, agents are uncon-sciously motivated towards maintaining their sense of ontological security which is secure as long as they are able to "tune in", to interpret and predict the outcome of their own and others' actions. What makes these interpretations possible is shared knowledge of the social context and routinized character of human interaction derived from that context. It is the habitual, recursive characteristic of routine, resulting in more or less consistent outcomes that help to continuously re-create the sense ontological security. At the same time, the routine or routinized practices are central to the theory of structuration. The process of structuration, then, entails the reproduction of structures in action. Agents come to reproduce the social structures according to the memory blue-prints concerning social interactions they acquired during the process of social and systemic integration. While still being influenced by structu-res, the agents retain a degree of autonomy in agency that enables them to manoeuvre within structural constraint. This autonomy is premised upon the d.c. and p.c. knowledge of their social world which allows them to predict outcomes of actions of others. Agency is influenced by all levels of consciousness. Motivated by the unconscious drives, the agents pursue their day-to-day goals. In doing so, they draw upon their knowledge, in order to choose the best success strategy, without disturbing their sense of ontological security. Because the sense of ontological security is derived from the trust in the predictability of the world, they come to act in concordance with the structural blueprints. Thus, the very conditions implicated in the constitution of the system in which agents are inte-grated, become unintentionally transmitted and reproduced across time-space with every act of structuration.

Haugaard's Critique

Haugaard's reconstructive critique of structuration theory raises two important issues. One is related to the reproduction of structures with regard to systemic stability/change and the other to the theoretical confusions in Giddens' account of power. Even though these two analyses are closely related, the remainder of this paper will discuss the theory of structuration in the context of systemic stability and change, while bracketing the issue of social power for the purpose of brevity. This argument further revolves around two particular points: the tenden-cy towards emphasizing systemic stability, and the theoretical independence of structuring agents from the others in social system. Although the structuration

theory presents coherent, and internally consistent, account of social reproduction via individual agency, "…it suffers from inherent lack in terms of the claims made for it with regard to the reproduction of structures" (Haugaard 1992, 101–102). This lack manifests itself in the theoretical independence of the process of structural reproduction from the existence of other social agents and in the implications this has for the ability of the theory to theorize societal change. In other words, structuration theory explains the reproduction of social structures "too well" (Haugaard 1997, 113).

Notions of the routine and ontological security become important at this point. Agents learn to trust in their social world by learning its rules and observing patterns of social interactions that bring about desired consequences. This trust helps to maintain the sense of ontological security and reinforces agents' tendency to routinely reproduce the structures in a different time-space. The double emphasis on routine, as a mechanism of reduction of ontological in-security and as the driving force behind recursive structuration practices also renders this model static. Agents learn to structure in particular way, while enjoying the agency and predictability facilitated by the structural constraint. They derive the sense of ontological security from reproducing conditioned structural relations through recursive practices. As a result, it becomes difficult to explain why agents would engage in novel structuration practices and induce social change even though Giddens keeps this theoretical avenue open (Giddens 1984, 27).

Routine is also central to the second criticism raised by Haugaard, that the concept of structures is theoretically independent from the existence of others. Agents come to re-constitute structures through recursive actions which, over time, become cast into a pattern that will be recreated in another time-space. Conceptualized like this, structures are unintended outcome of individual agency. However: "…what is not clear is how structures, as Giddens describes the production of them, through structuration practices, inherently pertain to a systemic forms reproduced by others" (Haugaard 1992, 104). Structuration and reproduction of social structures does not take place in social vacuum, but in the context of structuring others, which is a point not sufficiently acknowledged by Giddens. Haugaard introduces Berger and Luckmann's claim that "any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, …" and an example of a solitary person living on a deserted island that may engage in actions that will, over time, develop into a pattern (Berger & Luckmann 1967, 70). When interpreted against the theory of structuration, this example describes the establishment and recreation of structures through recursive practice, even in the absence of others (Haugaard, 1992). The change in structuration practices is possible when agents come to discursively examine the contents of their p.c. knowledge of social rules and decide to structure in novel ways. However, it appears that once the barrier between p.c. and d.c. is overcome, agents are free to change structuration prac-

tices at will. The only thing that stands in the way of this development is the sense of ontological security that agents derive from the recreation of established structures. As it stands, structuration theory describes agency-structure in a manner that is theoretically analogous to a solitary indi-vidual on a deserted island. Such position is theoretically incommensurable with Giddens' description of structures as "… a virtual order of differences produced and reproduced in social interaction" (Giddens 1979, 3). Here, Giddens acknowledges that structures derive their meaning from the system as virtual order of differences. That is, they become meaningful only in relation to other structures within the system. Yet, he does not provide enough theoretical space for this vital structural characteristic. Haugaard observes conceptual gap between structures as an ideal and as a pro-perty of social systems. Structures, existing as memory traces, are ultimately an outcome of individual actions. As a result, it becomes difficult to theorize the difference between rules that are created and reproduced socially and those irrelevant to social systems, both of which appear to be an outcome of the same process – individual structuration. This gap parallels the Wittgenstein's distinc-tion between language as socially constituted system of meaning and 'private language' denoting the language that is comprehensive and meaningful only to an individual agent (Wittgenstein 1968). Following this distinction, Haugaard terms these non-socially systemic structures "private structures" as distinct from "social structures". He further maintains that while accepting the idea that both qualify as structures per Giddens' definitions they would not be problematic from the perspective of social theory, what does create problems is the absence of mechanism that allows for distinction between the private and social structures (Haugaard 1992, 105).

Haugaard surmises that Giddens's account suffers from lack in terms of con-ceptual space allowed for the theorization of societal change. This is an outcome of preoccupation with individual recursive structuration practices and insuf-ficient attention to its intersubjective dimension. Given the central status ascri-bed to recursive practice and its role in maintenance of ontological security, it is unclear how the agents become motivated to change the structuration practice. Even if they confront their practical knowledge and overcome the sense of onto-logical insecurity related to novel structuration practice, it is not clear how this individual change translates into systemic change in the social context (Haugaard 1992, 106). Indeed, it would appear that once the agents make up their mind to overcome their ontological insecurity and change the structuration practice, nothing else stands in their way to initiate systemic change. While this may hold in the case of "private structuration" of a solitary individual without a member-ship to social system, this picture becomes more complicated in the context of structuring others.

In contrast to the hypothetical marooned individual, social actors are subject to one more, crucial, source of constraint derived from having to interact with others. These others are also structuring agents with particular p.c. and d.c. knowledge of the social system they have been integrated into. Successful social interactions require commensurable knowledge on both sides as well as mutual willingness to reproduce particular structural practice. In sum, then, the structural reproduction depends on three factors: "1) constraint derived from A's [actor initiating interaction] p.c. and d.c. knowledge of rules, 2) constraint based upon B's [agent responding to interaction] p.c. and d.c. knowledge of rules and 3) constraint derived from B's willingness to accept new rule as valid" (Haugaard 1992, 102).

He further claims that since Giddens does not examine the structuration practice with respect to B in relationship to A, it is difficult to theorize the transition from individual novel structuration practice into a systemic change. Thus highlightting the need for: "…built-in mechanism whereby *some innovative structuration practices are introduced (system change) and others are rejected (system stability)"* (Haugaard 1992, 110).

Production and Reproduction of Structures in Social Interaction

Haugaard seeks to overcome this deficit by the introduction of structuring others into the equation of societal reproduction. That is, by the theorization of the constraint derived from the structuring others' knowledge of structures and willingness to comply. The process of structuration takes place within the context of already established social systems that allow for a degree of predictability of agents' social world. The reproduction of structures in social interactions involves multiple structuring individuals in possession of different degrees of p.c. and d.c. knowledge of social systems and with different goals. When the actor A engages in structured interaction with actor B, it is not enough that A instantiates the structure-as-rule in action. Insofar as social structures facilitate predictability of others through production of more or less consistent outcomes in particular contexts, this social action should be followed by a predictable consequence in behaviour of others. In other words, the structuring agent B must confirm A's structuration by engagement in the predictable behaviour. If this is the case than we can say that structure has been reproduced (Haugaard 1992, 127).

Expanding upon Austin's (1975) distinction between felicitous and infelicitous speech acts, Haugaard discerns between four modalities that structured social interactions can take. These modalities represent mechanisms of praxiological (re)production of structures that allow social theorists to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful instances of structuration. This is done through

theorization of constraint imposed upon structuring agent by structuring others implicated in social interaction. These modalities are: *restructuration (confirm-structuration), destructuration*, *non-restructuration* and *absent restructuration* (Haugaard 1992, 131–132). But, before we turn to the individual analyses of these modalities, we need to explicate what is covered under the term social interaction. "What makes action specifically classifiable as social action is the probability that others will behave in a particular fashion and a consequent taking account of that probability in your action" (Haugaard 1992, 123). This sociability goes beyond simple stimulus-response relationship found in animal kingdom and presupposes shared socialized meaning between interacting agents. Both, in the case of A, who initiates meaningful interaction with the aim to produce B's behavioural outcome, and in the case of B who understands the meaning of A's action and takes it into account in her behaviour. This operational definition allows social theorist to make distinction between meaningful, structured, social interaction towards others and collective non-social action with regard to some outside phenomena.

Restructuration (Confirm-structuration)

Restructuration refers to a situation where the structured social interaction initiated by actor A achieves the predictable outcome in B. In order for this to happen, interacting agents must perceive the interaction as meaningful and possess commensurable conceptions of rules of given interaction. Since the structuration theory allows for a significant degree of agency of individuals relative to the structural relations, it is not sufficient that both agents understand the meaning of interaction. They must also have interests in, and be motivated to engage in it. In case of hypothetical exchange between A and B, A's commitment to interaction becomes evident by her initiation of interaction while B's willingness to interact manifests in her structured response. The process whereby structured interaction becomes reproduced as a result of these conditions has been termed *"restructuration"*. "*It is with the act of restructuration that social structures are reproduced.* Without restructuration there are no social structures, just rules" (Haugaard 1992, 127). This term was later changed to "confirm-structuration" because the initial use of term restructuration is somewhat ambiguous and might invoke a notion of re-doing and hence change. In line with this theoretical development he proposes an altered definition of social structures as: "…essentially, a form of regularity which is reciprocally recognized as meaningful because different actors see it as 'the same' as other actions performed in different time and space. In that sense it is, to use Giddens' words, a 'recursive' stretching of 'time-space patterning' but, to alter Giddens' premises significantly, this is not simply a

recursive act from the perspective of self (structuration) but presupposes confirm-structuring from others" (Haugaard 2003, 93). Thus, he highlights the importance of the active reproduction of structures through acts of restructuration, rather than more or less passive, unintended and self-propelled structuration. Most of routinized social exchanges of everyday life are structured in this manner. For example, phatic communion, or 'small talk', whereby speech is used to perform social task (e.g. the phrase 'hello, how are you?' in place of a greeting rather than expression of genuine interest in other person's wellbeing), or buying a kilogram of sugar, represent routinized structured interactions. These forms of social exchange are characteristic of interaction between agents exposed to similar processes of societal and systemic integration whereby agents internalize the rules guiding these structured interactions early and reproduce them (almost automatically) on a level of practical consciousness, bringing about the unintended, effect of structural reproduction in agency thereby.

De-structuration, Non-restructuration and Absent Restructuration

What about the cases where the agent B does not reproduce the structures accordingly? Building on the theorem of constraint derived from existence of structuring others, this situation can be an outcome of several possible modalities of interaction. It may either come as a result of a situation whereby B understands the rule according to which A structures the interaction, but decides, not to reproduce the structure; Or, B does not understand the rule guiding A's action and consequently cannot reproduce the structured interaction; Alternately, B cannot even register and take account of A's structuration practice and fails to respond altogether. The first variant, whereby agent B understands the rule (and its context) according to which A is structuring the interaction, but decides not to confirm the structure was termed *"de-structuration"*, due to the high degree of intentionality. This intentional characteristic differentiates it from the cases where B does not understand the rule according to which A structures the interaction or *"non-restructuration"*. And from the cases where B completely fails to react because she is unable to register the A's structuration practice termed *"absent restructuration"* (Haugaard 1992, 129–130).

   The cases of both non-restructuration and absent restructuration represent a situation whereby agents A and B have incommensurable knowledge of rules pertaining to a given interaction regardless of their hypothetical willingness to engage in interaction. In first case, the agent B takes A's attempt to engage in social interaction into account, but lacks the knowledge of rules allowing her to confirm-structure. In the second case, it may very well be that B possesses the knowledge of rules guiding the interaction, however cannot respond because she

did or could not register A's attempt to structure. The example of non-restructuration would be a misrecognition of phatic aspect of the greeting phrase "Hello, how are you?" as a literal request about one's wellbeing (which is actually a case of many individuals who find themselves in the English speaking environment for a first time). And the example of non-restructuration could be seen in failure to respond to the greeting phrase at all because of one's inability to hear or understand the spoken language.

The case of de-structuration presents us with an example whereby both agents understand the rules guiding the structured interaction, but respondent agent B decides, for whatever reason, not to follow the structural blueprint. It is important to note that B thoroughly recognizes A's action as an invitation to structured interaction, and she is well able to reproduce the rules in structured practice. However, is not willing to structure in this particular way and choses to respond in the way that takes account of the other but does not reproduce the structures guiding the original (from the perspective of A's intent) interaction. In the absence of the constraint derived from the limited knowledge of rules on the part of the actor B, the willingness or unwillingness to confirm structure can only be attributed to an individual agency. An example in point can be found in Haugaard's (1992, 124) analytical use of Garfinkel's breaching experiments whereby participants were instructed to interpret the phatic communication from others as literal requests, and to systematically de-structure the conversations in this manner:

> "The victim waved his hand cheerily.
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> **(A)** How are you?
> **(B)** How am I in regard to what? My health, my finances, my school work, my peace of mind, my…?
> **(A)** (Red in the face and suddenly out of control) Look! I was just trying to be polite. Frankly, I don't give a damn about how you are" (Garfinkel 1984, 44).

In this case A's attempt to structure according to the rules concerning phatic communion was recognized as such by B, yet B decided to structure according to a rules of normal communication aimed at exchange of information. Both agents engaged in social interaction, that is, action directed toward and taking account of others. Both agents also engaged in structuration insofar as their conduct was guided by rules pertaining to interaction with other. Yet neither of these attempts can be classified as reproduction of social structure (confirm-structuration) with regard to this particular use of communication because each of the involved agents falsified the expectations inherent in the others' perspective. "*Rules do not become structures purely through orientation towards other or through recursive*

application in structuration. Rules become structures in the moment that the rule governed expectations are fulfilled" (Haugaard 1992, 126). The theorization of these different possible mechanisms of structural (non)reproduction underlines the importance of constant reflexive monitoring of one's surroundings and actions. Haugaard contends that this monitoring also involves the evaluation of appropriateness of others' attempts to structure relative to one's knowledge of rules of given interaction. This evaluation then determines the success or failure of structural reproduction. Therefore, every single act of restructuration or de-structuration represents a political decision of either active acceptance or reject-tion of validity of a given rule in particular situation through reaction to partici-pation, even if it is a subconscious political act occurring on the level of p.c.

Systemic Stability and Change

When the attempt to convert the rule into social structure in interaction meets with confirm structuration, the structure is reproduced as socially meaningful, even if the structural reproduction is an unintended consequence of intentional action[4]. Both agents' knowledge of the rule becomes reiterated as valid within given context and yielding particular results. As a consequence, the probability that agents will draw upon this rule, and reproduce the structure further, increases. In the opposite case, where structuration fails to meet with confirm structuration, not only the rules do not translate into structures as elements in the system of meaning. The very rule according to which the initial act of structuration was ordered is violated. This outcome has high potential to disrupt the sense of ontological security, at least in cases where the agents have com-mensurable knowledge of social world. Agents no longer can rely on this rule in similar social circumstances and the likelihood that they use this particular rule again decreases.

Confirm-structuration is central to systemic stability. It can, at the same time, be seen as crucial component in explanation of systemic change. This is a case in situations whereby a novel rules and structuration practices become introduced and taken up by others who then recreate them in a different time-space. Haugaard uses the example of a Christmas card inventor, Henry Cole, who printed the first 1000 pieces in 1843 (Bunday, 1964). This initial act of structuration, considered as merely ephemeral business endeavour at the time, has been taken

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[4] According to Haugaard's theoretical position, the structural reproduction does not occur at random or by accident even if it is an unintended outcome of the intentional action. The modalities of structured interaction outlined above serve to elucidate the conditions under which social structures become reproduced.

up (confirm-structured) on an incredible scale and became translated into wide spread systemic feature of Christmas in many western societies (Haugaard 1992, 137–138). Following this conceptual strain of thought, the practices of de-structuration are related to systemic stability and change in similar, albeit somehow inverted, manner. On the one hand, the practice of de-structuration can be seen as an attempt to introduce systemic change. Agents who are discursively aware of the structured practice come to attempt to introduce a change in practice or its meaning through intentional de-structuration. On the other hand, the practice of de-structuration can serve to maintain a systemic stability whereby novel attempts as structuration practice become intentionally de-structured in favour of the already existing practices. The need to distinguish between individually meaningful structured behaviour and socially meaningful behaviour of an individual that contributes to systemic reproduction leads Haugaard to expand on the usage of the term "private" structuration practices. Which, in the context of theory of restructuration, designate "any action, including social action, that fails to meet with restructuration" as well as "social behaviour which fails to contribute to the fabric of social system" (Haugaard 1992, 134). Although rooted in Wittgenstein's (1968) notion of private language, the concept of private structure is much less restrictive and includes any structured action that can be meaningful to an individual or others, yet fails to contribute to the reproduction of social system.

The theorization of systemic stability or change through the modalities of structured interaction and the distinction between private and social structuration practices is closely intertwined with the concept of ontological security. In cases whereby an attempt at structured interaction fails to meet with appropriate response, not only the agents' knowledge concerning behaviour in particular context becomes violated, but their practices are also effectively rendered private by the others. That is, rendered irrelevant in a given context of practice. Their sense of ontological security becomes thereby disrupted and agents' feelings of insecurity come flooding in. Hence the adverse reactions to de-structuration practices in Garfinkel's (1984) experiments. At the same time, such situations of breakdown in structuration routine can provide an opportunity to discursively reflect on the practical consciousness knowledge of a given rule. And as such present agents with an opportunity to introduce systemic change.

Conclusion

This paper schematically outlines Haugaard's reconstructive reading of Giddens' account of the structural reproduction in the context of social systems. The introduction of modalities, that interaction between multiple structuring agents can take, overcomes the conceptual gap between the structuration as an individual

activity and structure as systemically constituted. Accepting the above arguments involves re-inscription of the relationship between unconscious and systemic change. While the sense of ontological (in)security can be still seen as the direct motivating factor of agency, it is no longer the sole, paramount, barrier standing in the way of societal change. The discussion of constraint derived from the existence of others highlights the fact that particular structuration practices are continuously evaluated (and enforced) by the others in social system. This inevitably leads to the discussion of relationships of power. As already mentioned, the issue of social power, has been intentionally bracketed here as the purpose of this paper is to briefly sketch out the basic elements and mechanisms of social reproduction within Giddens' and Haugaard's projects. This is not to diminish the importance of the matter of social power for either theorist. Quite the opposite, power is awarded central status in the theory of structuration and remains fundamental to Haugaard's work. Simplifying, power-to constitutes the agency derived from successful structuration/confirming structuration, while power-over as domination are part of de-structuration and constraint. However, a full account of this requires another paper. Suffice it to say, the conceptual toolbox introduced in this paper represent the underlying language used by Haugaard to examine the relationship between societal transformation, power and modernity. Thus, allowing for more explicit sociological understanding of the intersubjective interactions that either maintain systemic stability or induce change.

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