BECKER ARENHART, J. R. : The Problem with ‘the Background Logic Problem’
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Philosophica Critica, vol. 6, 2020, no. 2, ISSN 1339-8970, pp. 2-29
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Publication date: December 15, 2020
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Abstract: Anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic is, among other things, responsive to a posteriori evidence. This brings three questions to the fore: i) what is evidence in logic? ii) how to determine when evidence favours a particular logic, and iii) what kind of logic we use in such disputes? We argue that problem iii), when added to the thesis that natural language does have a specific logic, makes the whole project of logical theory choice untenable. The reason, we argue, is that the logic we are supposed to have vitiates any characterization of evidence, making a change of logic unlikely. We do that by considering two case studies involving adoption of paraconsistent systems, where the very idea that we have a logic operating in natural language prevent any possibility of change. We then go on and suggest, in broad lines, a version of antiexceptionalism without the natural language logic hypothesis.
Keywords: Logical abductivism – Logical theory choice – Evidence – Paraconsistency – Logic of natural language
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2020.6.2.2-29
Keywords: Logical abductivism – Logical theory choice – Evidence – Paraconsistency – Logic of natural language
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2020.6.2.2-29
