DUBOVEC, M.: Tengelyiho pojem slobody ako parciálnej kauzality / Tengelyi’s Concept of Freedom as Partial Causality
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Philosophica Critica, vol. 4, 2018, no. 2, ISSN 1339-8970, pp. 21–32
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Publication date: December 15, 2018
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Abstract: This paper focuses on the concept of freedom developed by the Hun-garian-German philosopher László Tengelyi. Freedom as one of the categories of the experience is a fundamental part of the project of a phenomenological metaphysics, which Tengelyi establishes in his 2014 study World and Infinity. Phenomenological metaphysics can-not be defined by the onto-theological structure of metaphysics and the explication of the concept of freedom demonstrates this non-tra-ditional variant of metaphysics. Because of this, freedom is character-rized as partial causality and does not correspond to Kant’s concept of parallel freedom as spontaneity. Furthermore, in his phenomeno-logical project of a metaphysical revival, Tengelyi sees in Heidegger’s transcendental concept of freedom a basis for the opposition betwe-en the parallel and the partial nature of freedom. Transcendental freedom as the ground of the ground belongs to the short but vivid metontological period of Heidegger’s thinking (1928-1930), for which it is of substantial importance.
Key words: Freedom – Partial causality – Phenomenological metaphysics – Metontology
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2019.4.2.21-32
Key words: Freedom – Partial causality – Phenomenological metaphysics – Metontology
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2019.4.2.21-32
