MACO, R.: Matematické vety ako pravidlá II. / Mathematical Propositions as Rules II.
Philosophica Critica, vol. 6, 2020, no. 1, ISSN 1339-8970, pp. 2-17
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Publication date: June 15, 2020
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Abstract: In the first part of this paper, I attempted to expound how philosophical questions about ontological and epistemological aspects of mathematics usually arise. Subsequently, I presented Wittgenstein‘s normative approach to mathematics, according to which many of these traditional questions are not really deep problems, but rather the consequences of misunderstanding the use of language, leading to semantic confusions and incorrect analogies. The present second part of the paper contains an outline of responses to several standard objections to the normative conception of mathematics. The main goal is to show that the normative understanding of mathematics has tools to answer questions about the truth and objectivity of mathematics, as well as two important distinctions: between pure and applied mathematics and between normative and descriptive propositions.
Key words: Mathematics – Philosophy of Mathematics – Truth – Objectivity – Descriptive proposition – Normative proposition – Wittgenstein
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2020.6.1.2-17
Key words: Mathematics – Philosophy of Mathematics – Truth – Objectivity – Descriptive proposition – Normative proposition – Wittgenstein
DOI: 10.17846/PC.2020.6.1.2-17